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Two experiments were conducted to explore the extent to which individuals with autism 
experience difficulties in monitoring their own actions, both online and in memory.  
Participants with autism performed similarly in terms of levels and, importantly, patterns 
of performance to IQ-matched comparison participants.  Each group found it easier to 
monitor their own actions/agency than to monitor the agency of the experimenter in a 
computerized task requiring individuals to distinguish person-caused from computer-
caused changes in phenomenology.  Both groups also showed a typical ‘self-reference 
effect’, recalling their own actions better than those of the experimenter.   Both tasks 
appear to be reliable markers of underlying action monitoring ability, performance on the 
‘Self’ conditions of each task being significantly associated, independent of verbal 
ability.  
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Pre-conceptual aspects of self-awareness in autism spectrum disorder: the case of action-
monitoring 
 
According to some theorists (e.g., Pacherie, 1997; Russell, 1996), Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) involves a deficit in a basic form of non-reflexive, ‘ecological’ self-
awareness – the ability to monitor one’s own basic actions.    Russell and Hill (2001, 
p.317) define action monitoring as, “the mechanisms that ensure that agents know, 
without self-observation, (a) for which changes in perceptual input they are responsible 
and (b) what they are currently engaged in doing”.  Effective action monitoring therefore 
allows an individual to distinguish between ‘self-caused’ and ‘world-caused’ changes in 
experience and hence, in Russell’s theory, gives rise to an experience of agency.  
According to the monitoring deficit view, individuals with ASD have a diminished 
feeling of responsibility for, or ownership of, their own actions ‘from the inside’, so-to-
speak.  This position is similar to that which Searle (1983) suggested an individual 
experiences when their ‘intentions-in-action’ fail to become conscious (for instance, 
when automatically changing the gears of a car).  Pacherie (1997) extended Searle’s 
analysis to suggest that children with ASD are unable to generate ‘motor images’, a form 
of conscious motor representation deriving from motor intentions for action (Jeannerod, 
1994).  It is these motor images which Pacherie (p.234) suggests provide “the organism 
with an awareness of what is intended and with a grasp of his body as a generator of 
active forces”.  According to Pacherie’s theory, therefore, difficulties in generating motor 
images results in action monitoring impairments in ASD. 
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Impairments in action monitoring in ASD have been inferred from findings of a 
reduced ability to discriminate between the actions of self and other in tests of source 
memory.  Hala et al. (2005), for example, found children with ASD less able than 
typically developing (TD) comparison participants, matched for verbal mental age 
(VMA), to recall whether a series of words had been spoken by themselves or by an 
experimenter.  More strikingly, studies by Russell and Jarrold (1999) and Millward et al. 
(2000) found an unusual pattern of memory performance in participants with ASD.  In 
each of these studies, participants with ASD were better able to recall the actions of the 
experimenter than they were to recall their own actions.  This ‘observer effect’ contrasted 
with comparison participants who recalled their own actions significantly better than 
those of the experimenter.  The ‘self-reference effect’ shown by comparison participants 
in these studies is characteristic of typical adult memory performance (e.g., Conway, 
2001).  On the other hand, the ‘observer effect’ shown by participants with ASD is more 
characteristic of the memory profile of typically developing children below 6 years of age 
(Roberts & Blades, 1998).  Difficulties in self-other source memory in ASD have not 
been found in other studies, however (Farrant et al., 1998; Hill & Russell, 2002), leaving 
a question mark over the reliability of the results of Hala et al., Millward et al., and 
Russell and Jarrold. 
The most direct method for assessing action monitoring abilities, according to 
Russell and Jarrold (1999), is to implement tasks which require the online (rather than 
memorial) discrimination of one’s own actions from those of an external agent.  Russell 
and Hill (2001) implemented such a task and found, contrary to their predictions, that 
children with ASD were as capable as comparison participants at judging which one of 
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several coloured dots on a computer screen was under their intentional control (through 
movements of the mouse) and which ‘distractor’ dots were under the control of the 
computer.   
In light of their results, Russell and Hill (2001) partially withdrew from Russell’s 
(1996) theory that ASD involves primary deficits in basic action-monitoring.  However, 
one difficulty with drawing conclusions from Russell and Hill’s study is that their 
experimental task may not have been sensitive enough to detect group differences, had 
they really existed.  An analysis of their results (see Tables 2 and 3 of their 2001 study, 
p.320) reveals that only 5 out of 28 participants with ASD showed any variation in levels 
of performance, with the remaining 23 participants performing either at ceiling (n = 13) 
or at floor (n = 10) on the task.   
In order to provide a more sensitive measure of action monitoring in ASD, 
therefore, the first experiment reported in this paper implemented a new action 
monitoring task, based on Russell and Hill’s (2001) task, but designed to produce more 
variation in performance.  First, in order to avoid floor/ceiling effects, this ‘Squares task’ 
was more incremental in terms of difficulty than the task implemented by Russell and 
Hill.  This was achieved by incorporating more distractor squares (up to 24, compared to 
6 in Russell & Hill’s study) and by manipulating the degree to which the movements of 
the distractor squares could deviate from the movements of the target square (see below 
for full details).   
The Squares task also differed from the task used by Russell and Hill in including 
an Other-person condition in which the experimenter moved the mouse, held by the 
participant.  This Other-person condition was completed by each participant in addition to 
Running head: Pre-conceptual self-awareness in autism 
 
6 
the Self condition in order to provide a more specific test of the action monitoring deficit 
hypothesis.  In the Other person condition, where there is no internal agency (i.e., motor 
intention) for the participant to experience, the only strategy available for success was to 
match the actual movements – felt by the participant, although instigated by the 
experimenter – with the corresponding visual information on the screen.  Here the 
participant was limited to monitoring the effects of another’s agency.  The Self condition 
was different: here the participant had the opportunity to monitor, or experience, their 
own agency, directly.   
For an individual with an inadequate experience of their own agency, these two 
conditions would appear to offer the same challenges, namely to match the felt actions 
(instigated by self or other) with visual information.  For the typical individual, who has a 
well developed (but still non-conceptual) experience of their agentic self, the Other-
person condition should be significantly more difficult than the Self condition because in 
the Other condition the participant acts without access to their own motor intentions.   
Experiment 1, therefore, provides a specific test of action monitoring abilities in 
ASD.  If individuals with ASD have an impaired experience of their own agency then 
they should find the Self and Other conditions equally difficult, because in both cases 
they might be considered as ‘dispassionate’ proprioceivers of their hand movements.  
Comparison participants, by contrast, should find the Self condition significantly easier 
than the Other-person condition because only in the former can they use their experience 
of willing and acting to their advantage.  The performance of participants with ASD 
should, therefore, be poorer than that of comparison participants in the Self condition 
only, if they have an impaired sense of their own agency. 
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The second experiment reported in this paper represented an attempt to replicate 
the findings of Russell and Jarrold (1999) that children with ASD a) are less able than 
individuals who do not have ASD to distinguish the actions of self and other in memory 
and; b) that they show a bias toward recalling the actions of others more reliably than 
their own actions.   A modified version of Russell and Jarrold’s ‘picture lotto’ card-
placement task was implemented, in which participants laid cards onto a corresponding 
picture board, either on their own behalf or on the behalf of a doll partner who they were 
‘playing for’.  Participants also witnessed the experimenter placing cards either on their 
own behalf or on behalf of the experimenter’s doll partner.  Participants were then given 
an unexpected memory test, requiring them to return the cards to the players who had 
placed them (child, child’s doll partner, experimenter, experimenter’s doll partner).  
 If participants with ASD do not encode, in memory, actions performed by 
themselves as strongly as do comparison participants, then they should be less accurate, 
overall, in terms of the number of items correctly returned to each player.  Also, unlike 
comparison participants, they should not display a self-reference effect by recalling more 
accurately the cards laid by themselves (on their own behalf) than those laid by the 
experimenter (on his own behalf).  Indeed, participants with ASD may be expected to 
show the opposite pattern of recall (the observer effect), as Russell and Jarrold (1999) 
found.   
One further aspect of the task, relevant to self-awareness but not explicitly 
considered by Russell and Jarrold, relates to the relative accuracy of recall for cards laid 
by the participant on their own behalf and those cards also laid by them but on behalf of 
their doll partner.  In terms of the motoric components of action, there is no difference 
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between laying cards on your own behalf and laying them on behalf of somebody else – 
both actions are self-performed.  However, only if one encodes experiences in relation to 
oneself, specifically, should one recall one’s own cards better than those cards that 
‘belong’ to someone else, even though they were laid by oneself.   
 
 






Participants.  Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the joint South 
London and Maudsley NHS Trust/Institute of Psychiatry Research Ethics Committee.  
Sixteen children with ASD and 16 comparison children participated in Experiment 1, 
after parents/guardians had given written, informed consent for their children to be 
included.  The participants in the ASD group had received formal diagnoses, by a trained 
psychiatrist or pediatrician, of autistic disorder (n = 14), Asperger’s disorder (n = 1) or 
pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS; n = 1) according 
to established criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  All participants in this 
group attended specialist autism schools, which required a diagnosis of autism, 
Asperger’s syndrome or PDD-NOS for entry into the school.  The comparison group 
consisted of children with intellectual disability of unknown origin, who attended 
specialist schools for pupils with learning difficulties.   
Baseline verbal and non-verbal abilities were assessed by an appropriate measure 
for the developmental level of each participant.  The verbal abilities of 13 (out of 16) 
children with ASD and 11 (out of 16) comparison children were assessed by performance 
on the Vocabulary and Information subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children – Third Edition UK (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991).  The verbal IQ estimate gained 
from this short form has high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  Because the lowest test age-
equivalent offered by the WISC-III is 6 years and 2 months, the VMA of any participant 
who fell below this level on either of the verbal subtests could not be calculated.  Under 
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these circumstances, participants were administered the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
– Second Edition (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997), which offers test age-equivalents down to 2 
years and 11 months.  In this instance, the verbal abilities of three (out of 16) children 
with ASD and 3 (out of 16) comparison children were assessed with the BPVS.   
The non-verbal abilities of all participants were assessed by the Block Design and 
Picture Completion subtests of the WISC-III.  The performance IQ estimate gained from 
this short form has high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  Participant characteristics for the total 
sample of ASD and comparison participants are presented in Table 1. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Given that some ASD and comparison participants received the WISC-III (Wechsler, 
1991), whilst others received the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997), statistical analyses were 
conducted on each sub-sample to ensure adequacy of matching in each case.  Independent 
t-tests comparing ASD and comparison participants who received the WISC-III revealed 
that participants were well matched on all variables (all ts < 0.70, all ps > .44).  Given the 
small number of participants who received the BPVS, Mann-Whitney U tests were used.  
ASD and comparison participants who received the BPVS were also matched on all 
variables (all Us > 1.00, all ps > .24). 
 
Design and procedures.  In the Squares task, a series of different coloured squares 
moved around the screen whenever the mouse was moved.  One of the squares (the target 
square) moved exactly consistently with the movements of the mouse (i.e., was under the 
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control of the participant), whilst all the other (distractor) squares moved in a random 
fashion (controlled by the computer).  All the squares began moving when the mouse was 
moved and all squares stopped moving when the mouse stopped moving.  Figure 1 
illustrates the task stimuli.  In the left window, the squares are in their starting position, 
before the mouse has been moved, whilst in the right window the squares have been 
activated by movement of the mouse.   
In both Self and Other conditions, the mouse was located inside a cardboard box, 
with both ends open so that the mouse could be accessed from each end.  This box 
obscured vision of the hand, so as to ensure that the target could not be identified through 
a strategy of matching observed hand movements with the movements of the squares on 
the screen.   
The task was presented as a series of up to 12 levels, graded in difficulty, with 
five 30 second trials at each level.  To move up a level, the participant had to complete 
more trials than would be expected by chance.  So, for instance, on level one there were a 
total of four squares on screen, one target and three distractors.  By chance, an individual 
would be expected to correctly identify the target on one in every four trials.  Therefore, 
to pass on to level two, a participant must have successfully identified the target on at 
least two of the five trials on level one.  On level two there were 8 distractors, going up to 
15 distractors on level three and then, finally, 24 distractors on level four.     
Another way in which the difficulty of the task was manipulated, in addition to 
the increasing number of distractors, was by varying the degree of similarity in the 
movements of the distractor squares relative to the target square.  The vector movements 
of the distractors could be varied, relative to the target square, on an arc of anything 
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between 0 and 360 degrees.  At 0 degrees, the distractors would move identically to the 
target square making the target impossible to identify.  At a movement arc of 360 
degrees, the distractors could move in any direction relative to the target square, 
providing the maximum differentiation between the movements of the target and the 
distractors.  If participants successfully completed level four then they moved onto level 
five which involved the same number of distractor squares (3) as did level one, but this 
time the distractors were restricted to a movement arc of 180 degrees.  Levels, six, seven 
and eight involved the same numbers of distractors as levels two, three and four, 
respectively, except at this restricted movement arc of 180 degrees.  If participants 
successfully completed level eight then they moved onto level nine which involved the 
same number of distractor squares as did level one, but this time the distractors were 
restricted to a movement arc of 90 degrees.  Levels, ten, eleven and twelve involved the 
same numbers of distractors as levels two, three and four, respectively, except at this 
restricted movement arc of 90 degrees.  Table 2 characterises each level of the task in 
terms of the number of distractor squares, number of trials required to pass and the 
movement arc of the distractor squares. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
In the Self condition, participants were free to move the mouse as they wished and when 
they believed they had identified the target they pressed the space bar.  At this point, the 
screen and all the squares on it froze and a cursor appeared.  The participant then moved 
the cursor over the square which they believed to be the target and clicked the left mouse 
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button.  Their choice of square was recorded automatically by the computer and the next 
trial began immediately after their choice had been made.  Before participants began the 
experimental trials, the experimenter demonstrated the task, completing two trials on 
level one, commenting to the participant, “Ok, I think I’m controlling the (say) red one 
(whilst pointing to the hypothesised target), so I press the space bar and then I choose that 
one by clicking on it”.  The child was then given two practice trials on level one before 
beginning the experiment.   
Once the Self condition had been completed, the participant took a short break 
before completing the Other-person condition.  In this condition, the participant again 
placed their hand on the mouse, inside the box.  The experimenter placed their own hand 
inside the box through the opposite end to the participant and took hold of the end of the 
mouse, using his index finger and thumb.  The experimenter proceeded to repeatedly 
move the mouse up, then down, then left and then right.  This series of movements was 
standardised across all participants.  Once the participant believed they had identified the 
target square under the experimenter’s control they pressed the space bar and, as before, 
moved the cursor over the square they believed the target to be and clicked the left mouse 
button.  The experimenter demonstrated the procedure again, under these new conditions, 
before allowing the participant to undertake two practice trials on level one, to familarise 
themselves with the procedure.  
 The key variables on the Squares task, therefore, were the number of levels (and 
trials) successfully completed in each of the Self and Other conditions, by each 
participant group.  
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Table 3 shows the mean number of levels and trials completed in the Self and Other 
conditions of the Squares task, by ASD and comparison participants.  Data were analysed 
in the first instance using a 2  2 repeated-measures ANOVA, with diagnostic group 
(ASD/comparison) as the between-participants factor and with number of levels 
completed in each task condition (Self/Other) as the within-participants variables.   
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The ANOVA indicated that the main effect of condition was significant, reflecting the 
superior performance of participants in the Self condition than in the Other-person 
condition, F(1, 30) = 13.28, p = .001, r = .55.  The main effect of diagnostic group was 
not significant, however, indicating that participants with ASD showed the same level of 
performance, across conditions, as comparison participants, F(1, 30) = 0.78, p = .38, r = 
.16.  Finally, the interaction between diagnostic group and condition was not significant, 
indicating that participants with ASD showed the same pattern of performance, across 
conditions, as comparison participants, F(1, 30) = 0.29, p = .60, r = .10.  Figures 2 and 3 
show the numbers of participants in each diagnostic group successfully completing each 
level in the Self and Other conditions of the Squares task, respectively.   
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A second ANOVA, with number of trials (rather than levels) completed in each 
task condition as the within-participants variables, produced an identical pattern of 
results: main effect of condition, F(1, 30) = 22.61, p < .001, r = .66; main effect of 
diagnostic group, F(1, 30) = 0.42, p = .52, r = .12; interaction between diagnostic group 
and condition, F(1, 30) = 0.39, p = .54, r = .11. 
 




The results of Experiment 1 do not support the claim that individuals with ASD 
are impaired in their ability to monitor their own basic actions, online.  There were no 
differences between the groups in terms of levels or patterns of performance.  Each group 
found it easier to identify the target square when they were in control of its movements 
(in the Self condition), than when the experimenter was in control of its movements (in 
the Other-person condition).  If individuals with ASD did not experience their own 
agency, then it should not matter who was in control of the mouse movements.  In either 
case, they would be merely ‘dispassionate observers’ of perceived consequences of 
actions.  Instead, it appears that, like comparison participants, they were able to benefit 
from access to their own motor intentions in the Self condition.   
Whilst individuals with ASD clearly experienced their own agency in Experiment 
1, the question of whether these experiences are encoded at a deeper level, in memory, is 
an unresolved question.  Experiment 2, explored the recall performance of children and 
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Participants.  Sixteen children with ASD and 16 comparison children completed 
the experimental task.  The comparison group consisted of children with intellectual 
disability.  The verbal abilities of 13 (out of 16) children with ASD and 11 (out of 16) 
comparison children were assessed by performance on the Vocabulary and Information 
subtests of the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991).  The verbal abilities of the remaining 3 
participants with ASD and 5 comparison participants were assessed by performance on 
the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997).  Non-verbal abilities were assessed by the Block Design 
and Picture Completion subtests of the WISC-III.  Due to limited child availability, the 
non-verbal ability of one (comparison) participant was not assessed.  ASD and 
comparison participants who received the WISC-III were matched on all variables (all ts 
< 1, all ps > .35), as were ASD and comparison participants who received the BPVS (all 
ts < 1.70, all ps > .13).  Participant characteristics for the total sample of ASD and 
comparison participants are presented in Table 4. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Design and procedure.  A baby animal picture lotto game, similar to that used by 
Russell and Jarrold (1999), was used for this task.  The game consisted of a board with 36 
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pictures in a 6 x 6 array and 36 corresponding picture-cards.  For the purposes of this task 
it was decided to exclude 4 picture cards, leaving a total of 32, because they depicted 
animals which were very similar to other animals on the board.  For instance, there were 
pictures of both a pig and a boar.  These were deemed visually and semantically similar 
enough that they might become confused in participants’ memories.  The aim of the game 
was to place each card on its corresponding picture on the board.  There were four 
‘players’ in this game: the experimenter, the participant and two dolls - one a Doctor, the 
other a Fireman - who would, respectively, be ‘partners’ for the experimenter and the 
participant.  The experimenter always sat to the left of the participant at the bottom left 
corner of the board, with the participant at the bottom right corner.  The Doctor was 
opposite the experimenter, in the top left corner, and the Fireman was in the top right 
corner, opposite the participant.   
One notable modification to the design implemented by Russell and Jarrold 
(1999) is in the number of stimulus items used.  Whereas they used a total of 24 cards (6 
cards for each player), this study implemented a total of 32 cards (8 cards for each player) 
in order to avoid potential ceiling effects in the current sample of participants who were 
developmentally more able, with VMAs approximately 17 months higher and VIQs 
approximately 20 points higher, than the sample of participants in Russell and Jarrold’s 
study.   
Each player had a pile of eight cards laid face down beside them, the 
corresponding board positions of which were evenly distributed.  Players took it in turn to 
place the cards down on the board.  The experimenter laid the first of his cards and then 
laid a card on behalf of his doll partner, the Doctor.  The participant then laid a card on 
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behalf of the Fireman before laying one of their own cards.  The game proceeded like 
this, moving in a clockwise fashion.   
It was explained to the participant that the experimenter would ‘play for the 
Doctor and put her cards down for her’ and that they (the participant) would ‘play for the 
Fireman and put his cards down for him’.  The participant was told, at this point, that 
each player had eight cards.  The participant was encouraged to label the pictures as they 
laid them down, whether on their own behalf or on behalf of their doll partner, and the 
experimenter labelled the pictures he laid down in a similar fashion.  As the game 
proceeded, the experimenter provided a commentary, emphasising the different origins of 
the cards, saying, “I’ve got a (names and lays own card).  Let’s see what the Doctor has 
got (experimenter names and lays the Doctor’s card).  What has the Fireman got? 
(participant names and lays the Fireman’s card)  And, what have you got? (participant 
names and lays his/her own card)”. 
After all of the cards had been laid, the experimenter removed the board, leaving 
the picture cards, and introduced the memory test.  The participant was instructed: ‘Ok, 
now you have to remember who each of the cards belonged to.  So, give the cards that I 
had back to me, the cards the Doctor had back to her, the cards the Fireman had back to 
him and the cards that you had back to you’.   The participant was reminded, at this point, 
that each player had started with eight cards and so should have eight cards at the end of 
the game.   If, during the recall phase, the participant returned more than eight cards to 
any particular player, they were reminded about this fact and encouraged to redistribute 
some of the cards (e.g., “The Doctor’s got 10 cards now, but she only started out with 8 
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cards, so 2 must belong to another player”).  No clues were given, however, as to which 
player to redistribute the excess cards. 
 
Results 
Table 5 shows the mean number of cards correctly returned to each player by ASD and 
comparison participants.  Data were analysed using a 2  4 repeated-measures ANOVA, 
with diagnostic group (ASD/comparison) as the between-participants factor and card 
origin (participant/experimenter/Doctor/Fireman) as the within-participants variables.  
Given that these data violated the assumption of sphericity, degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity.  The ANOVA indicated that 
the main effect of card origin was significant, showing that participants’ recall 
performance was reliably affected, overall, by the source of the items, F(1.91, 52.22) = 
3.49, p = .04, r = .25.  The main effect of diagnostic group was not significant, indicating 
that participants with ASD showed the same level of recall performance, overall, as did 
comparison participants, F(1, 30) = 0.10, p = .75, r = .06.    
The significant main effect of card origin was clarified through a series of simple 
contrasts, comparing the number of cards correctly returned to the child themselves to the 
number correctly returned to each of the other three players/origins.   These contrasts 
revealed that participants correctly returned significantly more cards to themselves than 
to their own doll (the Fireman), F(1, 30) = 14.88, p = .001, r = .58.  Participants also 
correctly returned more cards to themselves than to the experimenter, although this 
difference only approached significance, F(1, 30) = 3.67, p = .07, r = .33.  Participants’ 
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recall of their own cards was not significantly different to their recall of the 
Experimenter’s doll’s (the Doctor) cards, F(1, 30) = 2.18, p = .15, r = .26.   
Finally, there was no significant interaction between card origin and diagnostic 
group, indicating that participants with ASD showed the same pattern of recall 
performance as did comparison participants, F(1.91, 52.22) = 0.70, p = .55, r = .12.  
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
Relationship between performance on the source memory task and performance on the 
Squares task 
 
Of the 32 participants (16 ASD and 16 comparison) who received the Squares task, 26 
(14 ASD and 12 comparison) also received the source memory task.  A Self condition of 
the source memory task was created by combining the number of cards correctly returned 
by participants to themselves and to their doll partner.  Also, an Other-person condition 
was created by combining the number of cards correctly returned by participants to the 
experimenter and to the experimenter’s doll partner.  A series of exploratory correlation 
analyses were then conducted, comparing the performance of participants across each 
condition of the Squares and source memory tasks.  Given the small number of 
participants who received both experimental tasks and given that there were no between-
group differences on either measure, it was decided to collapse the diagnostic groups to 
increase the power of the analysis.  The following bivariate correlations were significant: 
Squares Self  Source Memory Self (r = .45, p = .02), Squares Self  Source Memory 
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Other (r = .50, p = .009), Squares Other  Source Memory Other (r = .40, p = .04).  The 
bivariate correlation between Squares Other  Source Memory Self was not significant (r 
= .13, p = .51).  In order to ensure that the above significant correlations were not 
confounded by general verbal ability, a series of partial correlations, controlling VMA, 
were conducted.  When VMA was controlled, only the correlation between Squares Self  




This study failed to replicate Russell and Jarrold’s (1999) findings of a source monitoring 
impairment in children with ASD.  Participants with ASD showed almost identical levels 
of recall performance to comparison participants.  Furthermore, they also showed very 
similar patterns of performance on the experimental task, each group finding their own 
cards the easiest to recall.  Both groups recalled fewer of the experimenter’s cards than 
their own cards and this self-reference effect was very nearly significant, with a moderate 
effect size (r = .33).  Both groups of participants also recalled their own cards 
significantly more reliably than their doll partner’s cards.  These findings suggest that 
individuals with ASD are typical in encoding information in memory in self-relevant 
ways. 
 It is potentially important that when both diagnostic groups were collapsed, 
performance on the Self condition (own cards + own doll partner’s cards correctly 
returned) of the source memory task was significantly associated with performance on the 
Self condition of the Squares task from Experiment 1, independently of the effects of 
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VMA.  Given the hypothesis that the Self conditions on each task are similar in involving 
the monitoring of one’s own intentions-in-action, this pattern of association is exactly 
what would be expected.  Despite superficially different demands, then, the Squares task 
and the source memory task appear to be similar in tapping an underlying ability to 
monitor one’s own basic actions.  
 





The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 do not support the notion that ASD involves a 
deficit in action monitoring.  In Experiment 1, participants with ASD were as able as 
comparison participants to distinguish the changes in visual phenomenology caused by 
their own intentional movements from those computer-generated changes, in an online 
action monitoring (‘Squares’) task.  The finding that both diagnostic groups found it 
significantly easier to distinguish such changes when they, as opposed to the 
experimenter, were in control of the target’s movement, shows that, contra Russell and 
Jarrold (1998), individuals with ASD not only generate a visual copy of a motor intention 
but also that they accurately monitor this generated copy (possibly unlike individuals 
with schizophrenia; Frith & Done, 1989).   
 The findings from Experiment 2 show that the ability of individuals with ASD to 
monitor their actions online extends to the ability to recall self-performed actions from 
memory.  The results of Experiment 2 clearly contrast with the findings of Russell and 
Jarrold (1999) who used a very similar source memory task to that implemented here.  
Whilst participants with ASD in Russell and Jarrold’s (1999) study showed an atypical 
profile of memory performance – recalling the actions they saw another person perform 
more reliably than those performed by themselves – participants with ASD in the current 
sample were typical in showing a ‘self-reference effect’.   
 Importantly, participants with ASD were also like comparison participants in 
recalling significantly more of the cards they laid on their own behalf than the cards they 
laid on behalf of their doll partner (the Fireman).  Whilst the ‘self-enactment effect’ 
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(Engelkamp, 1998) – a retrieval advantage for the actions performed by oneself rather 
than by another – is associated with the influence of motoric components resulting from 
one’s active agency, the ‘self-reference effect’ is thought to reflect the processing of 
information in self-relevant ways, independent of action/motoric mechanisms (Rogers, 
Kuiper & Kirker, 1977).  The fact that the motoric components involved in the 
experimental task were the same for the participant whether they were laying cards on 
their own behalf or on behalf of their doll partner, suggests that it is not merely the 
process of acting which scaffolded memory performance in these participants.  Rather, it 
appears that the cards laid by participants with ASD on their own behalf were (implicitly) 
encoded as ‘belonging’/relative to them and hence were processed at deeper levels.   
One potential reason for the discrepancy between our results and those of Russell 
and Jarrold (1999) could be the employment of a developmentally more able group of 
participants with ASD in the current study.  It may be less able individuals with ASD 
have an atypical, immature pattern of recall performance in such tasks, reflecting a 
difficulty in action monitoring.  However, the fact that other studies of self-other source 
memory in ASD, employing relatively less able individuals with ASD (e.g., Hala et al., 
2005; Hill & Russell, 2002), have failed to find abnormalities in patterns of memory 
performance speaks somewhat against this idea.   
One speculative idea is that the memory performance of children with ASD in the 
current study was scaffolded by the ongoing verbal commentary, strongly encouraged by 
the experimenter.  It may be that such commentary was not (so) encouraged in those 
studies of source memory that have found atypical patterns of recall performance in 
individuals with ASD (although Russell and Jarrold report that their participants were 
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engaged in commentary).  Our reasoning is that engaging in verbal commentary may lead 
to events being encoded as self-experienced and, hence, recalled more accurately from 
memory.  Comparison participants in previous studies might have naturally engaged in a 
form of (internal) commentary, regardless of whether or not they were instructed to do so, 
and hence displayed a self-reference effect.  Individuals with ASD, however, may have a 
reduced propensity for the use of certain forms of inner speech (e.g., Whitehouse, 
Maybery & Durkin, 2007; but see Williams, Happé & Jarrold, 2008 for alternative 
findings), leading to the observer effects demonstrated in other studies.  The ‘outer 
speech’ used by participants with autism in the current study may have provided the same 
function that inner speech does in individuals who do not have autism, and resulted in 
their displaying a typical self-reference effect.   
Such an idea remains speculative although testable by comparing the memory 
performance of groups of children with and without ASD who are engaged in self-
commentary with matched individuals with and without ASD who are not engaged.  If 
participants with ASD do not naturally use inner speech then those who are not actively 
engaged in overt verbal commentary should show an observer effect whereas those who 
are engaged should show a self-reference effect.  In contrast, participants without ASD 
who, hypothetically, naturally use inner speech should be relatively unaffected by 
engagement in overt verbalisation. 
Regardless of the validity of the above speculation, it is clear that the samples of 
children with ASD in the experiments reported here showed no evidence of action 
monitoring impairments, either in terms of online monitoring or in recall from memory. 
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Table 1: Participant characteristics for Experiment 1: Means and (standard deviations) 
  ASD Comparison t p Effect 
size (r) 
N 16 16    
CA: years 13.38 (1.24) 13.03 (1.74) 0.66 .52 .12 
     
VMA: years 9.05 (2.17) 8.76 (2.02) 0.39 .70 .07 
     
VIQ 72.00 (13.77) 69.88 (13.48) 0.44 .66 .08 
     
PIQ 72.25 (14.33) 69.33 (20.30) 0.46 .65 .09 










































Table 2: Stimulus characteristics of each level of the Squares task 
Level 
No. of distractor 
squares 
Min. no. of trials 
required to pass  




1 3 2 
360 
2 8 1 
3 15 1 
4 24 1 
5 3 2 
180 
6 8 1 
7 15 1 
8 24 1 
9 3 2 
90 
10 8 1 
11 15 1 






































Table 3: Mean (SD) number of levels and trials completed in the Self and Other 
conditions of the Squares task, by ASD and comparison participants. 










Levels completed 4.69 (3.88) 2.25 (2.41) 
Trials completed 12.75 (8.66) 5.75 (6.87) 
Comparison 
Levels completed 3.62 (3.10) 1.81 (1.87) 















































Table 4: Participant characteristics for Experiment 2: Means and (standard deviations) 
 ASD Comparison t-value p Effect 
size (r) 
N 16 16    
CA: years 12.44 (2.29) 12.24 (2.19) 0.24 .81 .04 
     
VMA: years 8.44 (2.04) 7.65 (2.12) 0.83 .29 .15 
     
VIQ 73.50 (12.29) 67.44 (13.59) 1.32 .20 .23 
     
PIQ 68.94 (18.90) 63.80 (17.37)
 a
 0.79 .44 .16 
      








































Table 5: Mean (SD) number of cards correctly returned to each player by ASD and 
comparison participants. 
   Player 
 
Group 
Child Child’s doll Experimenter 
Experimenter’s 
doll 
ASD 4.44 (2.00) 3.69 (1.54) 3.50 (1.75) 3.94 (1.39) 


















































Figure 1: Example of experimental materials from the Squares task.  
 
Figure 2: Number of participants in each group successfully completing each level in the 
Self condition of the Squares task 
 
Figure 3: Number of participants in each group successfully completing each  
level in the Other condition of the Squares task 
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